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Abstract 
We use laboratory experiments with different salient rewards (monetary rewards versus extra 
credits) to study collective decision making behavior under different informational structures. 
The results show that even though subjects’ behavior follows a similar pattern in both cases, 
subjects tend to act more efficiently when they are compensated with extra credits rather than 
money. 
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Incentivizing Experiments:  Monetary Rewards versus Extra Credits 
  
 
(1) Introduction 
 An important consideration in the design of any experiment is how to incentivize the 
subjects (i.e., how to encourage subjects to take the task seriously and to behave in a way 
consistent with how they would behave in a “real world” setting).  Economics has distinguished 
itself from the other social sciences by emphasizing the importance of real and salient incentives.  
The predominant means of doing so has been to offer monetary incentives.1  Subjects are paid 
for their time and the payment is a function of the decisions made during the course of the 
experiment.  Camerer and Hogarth (1999) note that the effects of monetary incentives are mixed 
and complicated but the presence and the amount of financial incentives seem to affect average 
performance or at least the variance of responses in many tasks. In many tasks (but not all), 
subjects work more carefully if they earn more money for better performance.  
 Obviously, if money is what is used to motivate subjects, then the ability to conduct 
research using experiments is limited by the availability of funds.  The number of subjects, the 
time commitment expected of subjects, and the complexity of the task all contribute to the 
expense of research using experiments.  Absence of or inadequate resources limit the work that 
can be done.  Furthermore, if money is the only incentive that motivates subjects then the use of 
experiments as a pedagogical tool is suspect.  Absent monetary incentives, classroom exercises 
might not generate the results expected.  
This paper considers whether there are other rewards, ones not subject to the same strict 
budgetary limitations, that never the less still provide salient incentives to subjects.  Given that 
most economic experimentalists draw their subjects from the convenient pool of university 
                                                 
1 Although monetary incentives are not always the “magic bullet” (Read, 2005), salient monetary incentives are still 
an integral feature of experimental economics. 
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students, extra credit is, potentially, just such a reward.  If extra credit is to substitute for money, 
two conditions must be satisfied.  First, extra credit points must provide a salient incentive to 
experiment subjects.  Second, the results of an experiment conducted with extra credit points as 
reward should track closely the results of an experiment conducted with money as reward.   
Evidence suggests that extra credit points do provide a salient incentive for experiment 
subjects.  For example, Kruse and Thompson (2001) find “class points” to be a salient incentive 
in an experiment designed to measure subjects’ willingness to pay to mitigate low-probability 
risk.2  The saliency of the class points is indicated by the students volunteering for the 
experiment.   
Evidence that extra credit points generate results that track results generated by money is 
less conclusive.  Kruse and Thompson (2001) report differences by gender in willingness to pay 
in the class point sessions but not in the money sessions.3  In contrast, Isaac, Walker, and 
Williams (1994) find, in a study of group size effects in a voluntary contribution mechanism 
game, that classroom experiments using extra credits as the reward provide results consistent 
with their similarly conducted experiment using money as a reward.4 
 In this paper, we use laboratory experiments with different salient rewards (monetary 
versus extra credits) to study collective decision making behavior under different informational 
structures. We make an interesting observation: although subjects behave similarly under both 
reward mechanisms, they follow the theoretical predictions more closely when extra credits are 
used. This of course may be a coincidence but it is reasonable to think that extra credits may 
reduce irrational behavior in student subjects. Compared to small monetary rewards, students’ 
                                                 
2 Class points replaced exam points. 
3 Women are more risk averse in class points than in money; men just the reverse. 
4 Isaac, Walker, and Williamson (1994) do not do any statistical tests but rather rely on eyeballing of the data. 
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grades can be more visible and important to the students. Therefore, extra credit points may 
emulate monetary incentives. 
 Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design. Section 3 
briefly explains the theoretical predictions and presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes 
the paper. All tables, figures, forms, and instructions are in the appendix. 
 
(2) Experimental design 
 For each session, 15 subjects were recruited to a common room.  For the monetary 
reward sessions, subjects were recruited by e-mail, posters, or class announcements; for the extra 
credit reward sessions, subjects were recruited by classroom announcement.  The extra credit 
sessions were held at a time separate from the usual class time.  This was done for two reasons:  
1) to be consistent with the procedures used in the monetary rewards sessions; and 2) so that only 
subjects who considered the extra credit a sufficiently salient reward (what is assumed to be true 
for participants in the monetary rewards sessions) participated.5   The extra credit session 
subjects were recruited from two Principles of Microeconomics classes taught by the same 
instructor.6  Of a total of 128 students, 120 participated.7  The same number of subjects 
participated in the monetary rewards sessions.8 
                                                 
5 Eckel and Grossman (2000) found that participants in a modified dictator experiment conducted in classes behaved 
differently than participants in sessions recruited to a separate location even though both played for monetary 
rewards.  Classroom participants were more likely to keep all of the endowment or give all of the endowment away 
than their recruited counterparts. 
6 The instructor used a fixed grading scale so not participating or doing poorly would not hurt a student’s grade in 
the class. 
7 Of the eight who did not participate, four did not complete the class, three failed, and the eighth had the highest 
cumulative grade in the two classes. 
8 Subjects in the extra credit rewards sessions did not complete the survey form reporting socio-economic 
characteristics completed by monetary rewards session subjects.  A review of the class roles indicates that the two 
samples did not differ significantly by gender (monetary rewards:  54.6 percent male; extra credit rewards:  53.3 
percent male) or by major (monetary rewards:  32.4 percent economics/business; extra credit rewards:  42.5 percent 
economics/business).  
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A session comprised ten rounds of a simple three-person investment game (eight for the 
extra credit sessions).  In each round a subject was randomly grouped with two other subjects. 
Groups were reformed after each round and no subject was grouped with the same two people 
for more than one round. The procedures preserved between-subject anonymity.  Subjects were 
identified by a randomly assigned, five-digit code number and were instructed not to 
communicate with each other. Subjects began each round with an endowment of $10 and had to 
decide whether or not to invest their whole endowment in a joint investment project. The project 
had three possible payoff scenarios (high, average, and low) each with equal probability of 
occurring. In each round different payoff scenarios were randomly assigned to different groups. 
Table 1 shows the possible scenarios.  
 The payoff structure satisfies certain characteristics such as:  a) no rational player has the 
incentive to participate by herself; b) a rational player should be willing to participate only if she 
is in Scenario 1 and believes that others will also participate; c) if one player defects from full 
participation, then she earns a positive payoff. In other words, the defector can free ride, gaining 
something from others participation while sacrificing nothing herself. For bad projects (Scenario 
3), participation may hurt nonparticipants; and d) efficiency requires either zero or full 
participation.9 
 The payoff structure was designed to exhibit the familiar problems of free riding and 
coordination failure (which exist in many organizations). Scenario 1 exhibits a potential of 
coordination failure: wellbeing is maximized if all group members invest in the project; each 
subject, however, finds it optimal to invest only if the other group members do the same. 
Scenario 2 exhibits the familiar free-riding problem: well-being is maximized if all group 
                                                 
9 Examples of such projects could include adopting new procedures or software that improves a firm's efficiency, 
helping to prepare a bid, or cooperating with a restructuring plan. In the political context, "projects" could include 
supporting controversial legislation or working for a candidate. 
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members invest but the dominant strategy is not to invest no matter what the other group 
members do. 
 Sessions were conducted under one of two treatments: complete information treatment 
(CIT) — all group members know the payoff scenario and decide simultaneously, but separately, 
whether or not to invest; or incomplete information treatment (IIT) — only one group member, 
the leader, knows the payoff scenario and decides first whether or not to invest. The other two 
members, the followers, only know the possible scenarios and their likelihoods. After observing 
the leader's decision the followers must decide simultaneously, but separately, whether or not to 
invest.  
 Theory predicts the following:  assume information is complete.  In Scenario 1 
coordination failure implies missed opportunities for mutually beneficial and individually 
rational cooperation.  Even if players somewhat coordinate on the most efficient equilibrium (all 
invest) in Scenario 1, they inefficiently fail to participate in Scenario 2 as the typical 
consequence of the free-riding problem.  Summarizing: the CIT exhibits failures of both 
coordination and cooperation.  In the Incomplete Information Treatment the story is different.  
There always exists a trivial equilibrium in which no one ever participates.  Alternatively, the 
leader can induce a productive equilibrium in which the leader invests when it is efficient to do 
so (in Scenarios 1 and 2) and followers mimic the leader (See Komai and Stegeman 2004 for a 
detailed characterization of the equilibria). 
We conducted four CIT and IIT sessions with monetary rewards and four with extra 
credits.  The extra credit sessions were conducted using experimental dollars with an exchange 
rate of $4 for each extra credit point.  At the beginning of each session subjects received a 
consent form and instructions, which were read aloud by the experimenter (see the Appendix for 
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copies of the instructions and other forms). Subjects were tested to make sure they understand 
the game. The experimenters monitored all the answers, corrected and explained any mistakes, 
and answered each subject's questions individually. 
 Subject's individual earning was calculated and announced at the end of each round using 
their five-digit code number. Subjects were informed that their final earnings would be those of 
only one round chosen at random (by the role of a die at the end of the game) and therefore they 
should make the best decision possible in each round. At the end of each session subjects were 
called up by code numbers to determine their earnings (and to be paid their earnings in private in 
the monetary rewards sessions). 
 
(3) Empirical Results 
 Figures 1 – 3 show by round the percentage of subjects investing by treatment and by 
reward type for Scenarios 1 – 3, respectively.  For Scenarios 1 and 3, there is little difference: 
subjects behaved in a reasonably consistent manner across treatment and rewards type.  For 
Scenario 2, subjects behaved reasonably consistently within reward medium but differently 
across treatments. 
Tables 2 – 4 report percentage investing by round, treatment, and reward medium as well 
as results for Binomial Proportions tests.  For all three scenarios, the round-by-round proportions 
test results do not, with rare exceptions, indicate any significant (p-value < 0.05) differences in 
subjects’ behavior by reward medium.10  However, in six of the comparable eight rounds in 
Scenario 1 - IIT, and all comparable rounds in Scenario 2 - IIT, the percentage of subjects 
investing is equal or higher in the extra credit sessions than in the monetary sessions.  In all 
                                                 
10 The exception are:  Scenario 1, IIT treatment, round 3; Scenario 2, CIT treatment, round 3; Scenario 2, IIT 
treatment, round 7; and Scenario 3, IIT treatment, round 4. 
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comparable rounds of Scenario 3 - IIT, the percentage of subjects investing is equal or lower in 
the extra credit sessions than in the monetary sessions. 
While the round-by-round difference may not be significant, the cumulative effect is.  
When we compare the overall investment rates (Total column) subjects in the IIT extra credit 
reward sessions consistently perform more efficiently than their IIT monetary reward session 
counterparts.  There is no significant difference in the overall investment rates for the CIT 
sessions.  For Scenarios 1 and 2, the overall investment rates for the IIT sessions are 18.1 and 
22.2 percent (respectively) higher for the extra credit sessions that the monetary rewards 
sessions.  For Scenario 3, the overall investment rate for the IIT session is 82.0 percent lower for 
the extra credit session than the monetary rewards session.  These results suggest that subjects in 
the extra credit reward sessions more effectively utilize the information contained in the revealed 
actions of the first movers.  In the CIT sessions, all subjects have the same information and 
subjects’ behavior, whether by round or overall, is consistent both within a scenario and across 
reward medium.  
 This conclusion is supported when we examine data on group cooperation.  Komai and 
Stegeman (2004) and Komai, Grossman, and Deters (2006) argued that an informed leader with 
uninformed follower acting in sequence (our IIT) can result in higher levels of cooperation than 
could an informed leader with informed followers acting simultaneously (see Komai, Grossman, 
and Deters, 2006) for evidence supportive of this hypothesis).  Thus, what is ultimately of 
greatest importance is whether group cooperation differs by treatments and reward medium.   
Tables 5 – 7 report results on group cooperation by treatment and reward medium.  Table 
5 reports the level of group coordination in Scenario 1. As expected, cooperation is high in 
Scenario 1 with more than two-thirds of all groups having two or more group members investing 
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regardless of the treatment or the reward medium.  However, while cooperation in the CIT 
sessions does not differ significantly for the two reward mediums (p-value = 0.081), there is a 
significant difference (p-value = 0.015) in cooperation between reward mediums in the IIT 
sessions.  Ninety-eight percent of the groups had two or more members investing in the extra 
credit sessions versus 85 percent in the monetary rewards sessions.    
Group coordination in Scenario 2 is reported in Table 6.  Theoretically, we expect higher 
cooperation in the IIT sessions than in the CIT sessions and our results are consistent with our 
expectations (see Komai, Grossman, and Deters (2006).  No group in the CIT sessions fully 
cooperates (regardless of reward medium) versus 38.2 percent and 57.1 percent in the IIT 
monetary and extra credit sessions, respectively.  (Comparing monetary versus extra credit 
session results, we find that the reward medium has no significant effect on cooperation.)  
Scenario 3 results are reported in table 7.  Optimal individual and group behavior, 
regardless of the treatment, in this scenario is to not invest and more than 70 percent of all 
groups had zero members investing.  For the CIT sessions, there is no significant difference in 
group cooperation between the monetary and extra credit reward sessions (p-value = 0.965).  For 
the IIT session, subjects behave more efficiently in the extra credit sessions than in the monetary 
rewards sessions (this difference is statistically significant; p-value = 0.002).  Ninety-six percent 
of all groups in the extra credit sessions invested nothing in the project while only 71.4 percent in 
the monetary rewards sessions followed the same pattern.  Again our results suggest that subjects 
in the extra credit sessions more effectively use the information provided by a first moving 
leader than do their counterparts in the monetary rewards sessions.   
 Before concluding it is necessary to note a possible confound affecting our results.  As 
noted above, subjects in the extra credit sessions were students in Principles of Microeconomics 
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classes taught by one of the authors.  As such, results may be biased by an experimenter effect.  
We however consider this to have, at best, only minimal effect for two reasons.  First, Komai had 
not lectured about free-riding or efficient group behavior prior to the experiment. This should 
minimize any experimenter effect, for subjects were not aware of what the teacher expected from 
them.  Second, if the experimenter effect biased subjects’ decisions towards the more efficient 
outcomes then this should have been observed in the CIT results as well, not just the IIT results.  
In all three scenarios, the decisions of subjects’ in the CIT did not differ significantly between 
the two reward mediums.   
 
(4) Conclusion 
The purpose of this project is to determine whether or not different reward mediums 
(both of which are real and salient) elicit different responses in a laboratory experiment designed 
to study collective decision making behavior under different informational structures.  We 
compare the customary monetary earnings to classroom extra credit.  Subjects participated in a 
three-person investment game that was designed to exhibit the familiar problems of free riding 
and coordination failure. Subjects played the game under one of two treatments: Complete 
Information – all subjects act simultaneously based on the same information set; and Incomplete 
Information – a fully-informed leader acts first followed by uninformed leaders knowing only 
the leader’s decision to invest or not.  Subjects participated in either a monetary rewards session 
or an extra credit rewards session. 
The two reward mediums generate similar patterns of behavior with, however, some 
interesting differences.  For the Complete Information sessions, all subjects have the same 
information on which to base their investment decisions.  In this case the reward medium has no 
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significant differential effects.  Both round by round and overall subjects behaved in a like 
fashion.   
For the Incomplete Information sessions, uninformed followers can deduce their best 
course of action by reading the actions of their group leaders (investing or not as the leader 
invests or not).  While round by round, there is little difference in subjects’ behavior (though the 
direction of the difference is consistent), overall the minor differences sum to significant 
differences.  Subjects in the Incomplete Information, extra credit sessions consistently 
outperform their Incomplete Information, monetary sessions.  The evidence suggests that 
subjects in the Incomplete Information, extra credit sessions more efficiently exploit the 
information contained in their group leaders’ actions.  An explanation consistent with the results 
is that extra credit points are a more valuable reward than money (at least for college students), 
sufficiently so to induce subjects to pay closer attention to experiment instructions and to the 
actions of their fellow players, thereby reducing “mistakes” due to confusion or inattention.   
The reported results support a conclusion that, for the convenience sample of college 
students, extra credit points are sufficiently real and salient.   Our extra credit sessions subjects 
treated the task at least as seriously as, and behaved in a manner consistent with, that of our 
monetary sessions subjects.  This finding suggests that researchers lacking the necessary funding 
to conduct desired experiments might be able to circumvent this constraint and incentivize their 
experiments by using extra credit points.   The results also support the use of experiments as a 
pedagogical tool.  We would however suggest caution.  While there may be a number of 
experiment types where extra credit rewards will provide results consistent with results generated 
by monetary rewards, we do not believe our results will generalize to all experiment types.  In 
particular, experiments designed to elicit subjects’ charitable or altruistic nature and 
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trustworthiness are, we predict, likely to generate different outcomes depending on the reward 
medium employed.  We would not be surprised to find that subjects played in a manner more 
consistent with theoretical predictions when extra credit is the reward medium than is observed 
when money is the reward medium.  
 13
REFERENCES 
 
Camerer, Colin F. and Hogarth, Robin M. (1999).  The Effect of Financial Incentives in 
Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor- Production Framework,  Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 19: 7-42. 
Eckel, Catherine C. and Grossman, Philip J.  (2000).  Volunteers and Pseudo-Volunteers:  The 
Effect of Recruitment Method in Dictator Experiments.  Experimental Economics 3:  
107-120.   
Isaac Mark R., Walker James M., and Williams Arlington W. (1994). Group Size and the 
Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. Journal of Public Economics 54:1-36. 
Komai, Mana, and Stegeman Mark (2004). An Economic Theory of Leadership Based on 
Assignment of Information. Working Paper. 
Komai, Mana, Stegeman Mark, and Hermalin Benjamin. (Forthcoming). Leadership and 
Information. American Economic Review.  
Kruse, Jamie B. and Thompson, Mark A. (2001).  A Comparison of Salient Rewards in 
Experiments: Money and Class Points.  Economic Letters 74: 113-117. 
Read, Daniel. (2005).  Monetary Incentives: What Are They Good for?.  Journal of Economic 
Methodology 12: 265-276. 
 14
Table 1: Payoff Matrices for Investment Scenarios 
 
Scenario 1 Investors (each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
Scenario 2 Investors (each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
Scenario 3 Investors (each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
All invest 20 - All invest 13 - All invest 0 - 
Two invest 13 17 Two invest 9 15 Two invest 0 8 
One invests 7 14 One invests 5 12 One invests 0 9 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
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Table 2:  Scenario 1 Individual Invest Rates – Money vs. Extra Credit 
 
 
Period  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Money 83.3% 72.2% 75.0% 72.2% 70.8% 83.3% 75.0% 66.7% 77.8% 81.0% 76.2% 
Extra Credit 50.0% 60.6% 66.7% 73.3% 50.0% 66.7% 83.3% 100.0% … … 67.4% 
CIT Proportions 
test 
p-value 
0.171 0.307 0.653 0.943 0.220 0.182 0.515 0.063 … … 0.176* 
             
Money 83.3% 77.8% 66.7% 94.4% 75.0% 70.8% 81.0% 83.3% 55.6% 73.8% 75.4% 
Extra Credit 73.3% 93.9% 100.0% 93.3% 100.0% 75.0% 88.9% 100.0% … … 89.1% 
IIT Proportions 
test 
p-value 
0.627 0.137 0.029 0.894 0.058 0.745 0.632 0.205 … … 0.005* 
             
Money: 
CIT vs. IIT 
Proportions 
test 
p-value 
1.000 0.586 0.653 0.074 0.745 0.303 0.632 0.505 0.157 0.434 0.844 
Extra Credit: 
CIT vs. IIT 
Proportions 
test 
p-value 
0.212 0.004 0.029 0.142 0.005 0.525 0.630 1.000 … … 0.000 
 
* Money vs. Extra Credit tests calculated for periods 1-8 only. 
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Table 3:  Scenario 2 Individual Invest Rates – Money vs. Extra Credit 
 
 
Period  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Money 37.5% … 31.0% 33.3% 29.2% 12.5% 16.7% 8.3% 5.6% 16.7% 22.5% 
Extra Credit 37.0% 27.8% 11.1% 23.8% 23.3% 19.0% 0.00% 9.5% … … 19.3% 
CIT Proportions 
test 
p-value 
0.973 … 0.034 0.510 0.627 0.545 0.069 0.889 … … 0.166* 
             
Money 75.0% … 52.4% 44.4% 45.8% 37.5% 50.0% 75.0% 66.7% 50.0% 55.4% 
Extra Credit 75.0% 66.7% 63.9% 44.4% 70.0% 54.2% 88.9% 80.9% … … 67.7% 
IIT Proportions 
test 
p-value 
1.000 … 0.305 1.000 0.073 0.247 0.008 0.632 … … 0.010* 
             
Money: 
CIT vs. IIT 
Proportions 
test 
p-value 
0.009 … 0.046 0.494 0.233 0.046 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.221 0.000 
Extra Credit: 
CIT vs. IIT 
Proportions 
test 
p-value 
0.007 0.019 0.000 0.173 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 … … 0.000 
 
* Money vs. Extra Credit tests calculated for periods 1 and 3-8 only. 
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Table 4:  Scenario 3 Individual Invest Rates – Money vs. Extra Credit 
 
 
Period  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Money 3.3% 4.2% 0.0% 4.2% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 2.7% 
Extra Credit 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 8.3% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% … … 3.9% 
CIT Proportions 
test 
p-value 
0.398 0.473 1.000 0.551 0.551 1.000 1.000 0.313 … … 0.784* 
             
Money 16.7% 20.8% 0.0% 16.7% 8.3% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 16.7% 11.1% 
Extra Credit 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% … … 2.0% 
IIT Proportions 
test 
p-value 
0.818 0.137 1.000 0.027 0.213 0.064 1.000 1.000 … … 0.001* 
             
Money: 
CIT vs. IIT 
Proportions 
test 
p-value 
0.085 0.081 1.000 0.156 1.000 0.064 1.000 0.313 0.312 0.140 0.001 
Extra Credit: 
CIT vs. IIT 
Proportions 
test 
p-value 
0.072 0.303 1.000 0.126 0.070 1.000 1.000 1.000 … … 0.310 
 
 
* Money vs. Extra Credit tests calculated for periods 1-8 only. 
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Table 5:  Scenario 1 Group Coordination – Money vs. Extra Credit 
 
Number Choosing to Invest   
0 
(%) 
1 
(%) 
2 
(%) 
3 
(%) 
Χ2 test  
(p-value) 
d.f. 
Money 3 (4.3) 
7 
(10.0) 
27 
(38.6) 
33 
(47.1) CIT 
Extra Credit 0 (0.0) 
14 
(31.1) 
16 
(35.5) 
15 
(33.3) 
5.03 
(0.081) 
3 
       
Money 2 (2.9) 
8 
(11.6) 
29 
(42.0) 
30 
(43.5)  
IIT Extra Credit 0 (0.0) 
1 
(2.2) 
14 
(30.4) 
31 
(67.4) 
8.35 
(0.015)  
3 
       
Money:  CIT vs. IIT 
0.74 
(0.925)  
3 
Extra Credit:  CIT vs. IIT 
17.00 
(0.000)  
2 
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Table 6:  Scenario 2 Group Coordination – Money vs. Extra Credit 
 
Number Choosing to Invest   
0 
(%) 
1 
(%) 
2 
(%) 
3 
(%) 
Χ2 test  
(p-value) 
d.f. 
Money 33 (48.5) 
24 
(35.3) 
11 
(16.2) 
0 
(0.0) CIT 
Extra Credit 33 (51.6) 
25 
(39.1) 
6 
(9.4) 
0 
(0.0) 
1.37 
(0.504)  
2 
       
Money 21 (30.9) 
7 
(10.3) 
14 
(20.6) 
26 
(38.2)  
IIT Extra Credit 14 (22.2) 
6 
(9.5) 
7 
(11.1) 
36 
(57.1) 
5.24 
(0.155)  
3 
       
Money:  CIT vs. IIT 
38.30 
(0.000)  
3 
Extra Credit:  CIT vs. IIT 
55.4 
(0.000)  
3 
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Table 7:  Scenario 3 Group Coordination – Money vs. Extra Credit 
 
 
Number Choosing to Invest   
0 
(%) 
1 
(%) 
2 
(%) 
3 
(%) 
Χ2 test  
(p-value) 
d.f. 
Money 57 (91.9) 
5 
(8.13) 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) CIT 
Extra Credit 47 (92.2) 
3 
(5.9) 
0 
(0.0) 
1 
(2.0) 
0.002 
(0.965)  
2 
       
Money 45 (71.4) 
15 
(23.8) 
3 
(4.8) 
0 
(0.0)  
IIT Extra Credit 49 (96.1) 
1 
(2.0) 
1 
(2.0) 
0 
(0.0) 
12.30 
(0.002)  
2 
       
Money:  CIT vs. IIT 
9.40 
(0.009)  
2 
Extra Credit:  CIT vs. IIT 
1.04 
(0.594)  
2 
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Figure 1:  Scenario 1 Investing Rates 
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Figure 2:  Scenario 2 Investing Rates
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Figure 3:  Scenario 3 Investing Rates 
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APPENDIX 
 
CIT Instructions- Monetary Reward 
 
 This is an experiment about decision-making involving 15 participants. You must 
not talk to the other participants or communicate with them in any way during the 
experiment. If at any time you have questions, raise your hand and we come to you to 
answer them. 
 You have received a folder with a unique five digit code number. You will use 
this number to collect your earnings at the end of this session. 
  The experiment consists of 10 rounds. In each round you play an investment 
game. At the end of each round your earnings will be calculated and announced. You are 
given a record sheet on which you should record your decision and earnings at the end of 
each round. Your final earnings will be those of only one round, chosen at random (by 
the role of a die) at the end of the experiment. Since you don't know which round will 
determine your earnings, it is important that you make the best decision possible in each 
round. Your earnings will be paid to you in private at the end of the experiment. 
 At the end of the experiment you will receive a survey form. Please complete the 
questions. When you have completed the survey deposit it in the box at the front of the 
room. You will then be called up to receive your earnings and then you are free to go. 
 
The game 
 In each round you will be randomly grouped with two other participants. Groups 
will be reformed each round. You will not be with the same two people more than one 
round. 
 At the beginning of each round you will each be given an endowment of $10. You 
must decide whether to invest or not invest your endowment in a joint investment project. 
The project's potential return is randomly determined at the beginning of each round and 
will vary from round to round. In each round three scenarios are equally likely to happen: 
Scenario 1 in which potential returns are high, Scenario 2 in which potential returns are 
average, and Scenario 3 in which potential returns are low. The potential return is the 
same for you and the other members of your group for that round. Potential returns, 
however, may vary among groups. The three scenarios are shown below: 
 
Scenario 
1 
Investors 
(each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
Scenario 
2 
Investors 
(each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
Scenario 
3 
Investors 
(each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
All 
invest 20 - 
All 
invest 13 - 
All 
invest 0 - 
Two 
invest 13 17 
Two 
invest 9 15 
Two 
invest 0 8 
One 
invests 7 14 
One 
invests 5 12 
One 
invests 0 9 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
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 Your earnings depend on your decision, the decisions of the others in your group, 
and the return to the project. 
 Before we start the game we will practice to make sure you understand the game 
and your potential earnings.
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IIT Instructions- Monetary Reward 
 
 This is an experiment about decision-making involving 15 participants. You must 
not talk to the other participants or communicate with them in any way during the 
experiment. If at any time you have questions, raise your hand and we come to you to 
answer them. 
 You have received a folder with a unique five digit code number. You will use 
this number to collect your earnings at the end of this session. 
 The experiment consists of 10 rounds. In each round you play an investment 
game. At the end of each round your earnings will be calculated and announced. You are 
given a record sheet on which you should record your decision and earnings at the end of 
each round. Your final earnings will be those of only one round, chosen at random (by 
the role of a die) at the end of the experiment. Since you don't know which round will 
determine your earnings, it is important that you make the best decision possible in each 
round. Your earnings will be paid to you in private at the end of the experiment. 
 At the end of the experiment you will receive a survey form. Please complete the 
questions. When you have completed the survey deposit it in the box at the front of the 
room. You will then be called up to receive your earnings and then you are free to go. 
 
The game 
 In each round you will be randomly grouped with two other participants. Groups 
will be reformed each round. You will not be with the same two people more than one 
round. 
 At the beginning of each round you will each be given an endowment of $10. You 
must decide whether to invest or not invest your endowment in a joint investment project. 
The project's potential return is randomly determined at the beginning of each round and 
will vary from round to round. In each round three scenarios are equally likely to happen: 
Scenario 1 in which potential returns are high, Scenario 2 in which potential returns are 
average, and Scenario 3 in which potential returns are low. The potential return is the 
same for you and the other members of your group for that round. Your earnings depend 
on your decision, the decisions of the others in your group, and the return to the project. 
The three scenarios are below: 
 
Scenario 
1 
Investors 
(each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
Scenario 
2 
Investors 
(each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
Scenario 
3 
Investors 
(each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
All 
invest 20 - 
All 
invest 13 - 
All 
invest 0 - 
Two 
invest 13 17 
Two 
invest 9 15 
Two 
invest 0 8 
One 
invests 7 14 
One 
invests 5 12 
One 
invests 0 9 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
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 In each group one member is selected randomly and will be informed which 
scenario has been assigned to his/her group. The other two members will not know the 
scenario. At the beginning of the game you get a sheet of paper that tells you whether or 
not you are the informed member. The game is then played in two stages: 
 Stage 1: At this stage the informed member observes the scenario and decides 
whether or not to invest in the project. The uninformed members do not make a decision 
in this stage. They, however, should pretend that they are making a decision by drawing a 
circle. It is important not to show your identity to the others. 
 Stage 2: At this stage the uninformed members will be informed about the 
decision made by the first person and then will simultaneously decide whether or not to 
invest in the project. The first mover does nothing at this stage but should pretend that 
he/she is making a decision by drawing a circle on the paper. 
 Before we start the game we will practice to make sure you understand the game 
and your potential earning.
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CIT Instructions – Extra Credit Reward 
 
 This is an experiment about decision-making involving 15 participants. You must 
not talk to the other participants or communicate with them in any way during the 
experiment. If at any time you have questions, raise your hand and we come to you to 
answer them. 
 You have received a folder with a unique five digit code number. You will use 
this number to collect your earnings at the end of this session. 
  The experiment consists of 10 rounds. In each round you play an investment 
game. At the end of each round your earnings will be calculated and announced. You are 
given a record sheet on which you should record your decision and earnings at the end of 
each round. Your final earnings will be those of only one round, chosen at random (by 
the role of a die) at the end of the experiment. Since you don't know which round will 
determine your earnings, it is important that you make the best decision possible in each 
round. Your earnings will be paid to you in private at the end of the experiment. 
 At the end of the experiment you will receive a survey form. Please complete the 
questions. When you have completed the survey deposit it in the box at the front of the 
room. You will then be called up to receive your earnings and then you are free to go. 
 
The game 
 In each round you will be randomly grouped with two other participants. Groups 
will be reformed each round. You will not be with the same two people more than one 
round. 
 At the beginning of each round you will each be given an endowment of $10. You 
must decide whether to invest or not invest your endowment in a joint investment project. 
The project's potential return is randomly determined at the beginning of each round and 
will vary from round to round. In each round three scenarios are equally likely to happen: 
Scenario 1 in which potential returns are high, Scenario 2 in which potential returns are 
average, and Scenario 3 in which potential returns are low. The potential return is the 
same for you and the other members of your group for that round. Potential returns, 
however, may vary among groups. The three scenarios are shown below: 
 
Scenario 
1 
Investors 
(each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
Scenario 
2 
Investors 
(each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
Scenario 
3 
Investors 
(each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
All 
invest 20 - 
All 
invest 13 - 
All 
invest 0 - 
Two 
invest 13 17 
Two 
invest 9 15 
Two 
invest 0 8 
One 
invests 7 14 
One 
invests 5 12 
One 
invests 0 9 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
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 Your earnings depend on your decision, the decisions of the others in your group, 
and the return to the project.  
 Your earnings will be transformed to extra credit points. The extra credit point is 
1/4 of your earning. For example if you earn 20 dollars here your extra credit point will 
be 20/4=5. 
 Before we start the game we will practice to make sure you understand the game 
and your potential earnings.
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IIT Instructions- Extra Credit Reward 
 
 This is an experiment about decision-making involving 15 participants. You must 
not talk to the other participants or communicate with them in any way during the 
experiment. If at any time you have questions, raise your hand and we come to you to 
answer them. 
 You have received a folder with a unique five digit code number. You will use 
this number to collect your earnings at the end of this session. 
 The experiment consists of 10 rounds. In each round you play an investment 
game. At the end of each round your earnings will be calculated and announced. You are 
given a record sheet on which you should record your decision and earnings at the end of 
each round. Your final earnings will be those of only one round, chosen at random (by 
the role of a die) at the end of the experiment. Since you don't know which round will 
determine your earnings, it is important that you make the best decision possible in each 
round. Your earnings will be paid to you in private at the end of the experiment. 
 At the end of the experiment you will receive a survey form. Please complete the 
questions. When you have completed the survey deposit it in the box at the front of the 
room. You will then be called up to receive your earnings and then you are free to go. 
 
The game 
 In each round you will be randomly grouped with two other participants. Groups 
will be reformed each round. You will not be with the same two people more than one 
round. 
 At the beginning of each round you will each be given an endowment of $10. You 
must decide whether to invest or not invest your endowment in a joint investment project. 
The project's potential return is randomly determined at the beginning of each round and 
will vary from round to round. In each round three scenarios are equally likely to happen: 
Scenario 1 in which potential returns are high, Scenario 2 in which potential returns are 
average, and Scenario 3 in which potential returns are low. The potential return is the 
same for you and the other members of your group for that round. Your earnings depend 
on your decision, the decisions of the others in your group, and the return to the project. 
The three scenarios are below: 
 
Scenario 
1 
Investors 
(each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
Scenario 
2 
Investors 
(each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
Scenario 
3 
Investors 
(each) 
Non-
investors 
(each) 
All 
invest 20 - 
All 
invest 13 - 
All 
invest 0 - 
Two 
invest 13 17 
Two 
invest 9 15 
Two 
invest 0 8 
One 
invests 7 14 
One 
invests 5 12 
One 
invests 0 9 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
Nobody 
invests - 10 
 31
 Your earnings will be transformed to extra credit points. The extra credit point is 
1/4 of your earning. For example if you earn 20 dollars here your extra credit point will 
be 20/4=5. 
 In each group one member is selected randomly and will be informed which 
scenario has been assigned to his/her group. The other two members will not know the 
scenario. At the beginning of the game you get a sheet of paper that tells you whether or 
not you are the informed member. The game is then played in two stages: 
 Stage 1: At this stage the informed member observes the scenario and decides 
whether or not to invest in the project. The uninformed members do not make a decision 
in this stage. They, however, should pretend that they are making a decision by drawing a 
circle. It is important not to show your identity to the others. 
 Stage 2: At this stage the uninformed members will be informed about the 
decision made by the first person and then will simultaneously decide whether or not to 
invest in the project. The first mover does nothing at this stage but should pretend that 
he/she is making a decision by drawing a circle on the paper. 
 Before we start the game we will practice to make sure you understand the game 
and your potential earning.
 32
Practice Questions 
 
Practice 1 
Suppose you are in Scenario 1. 
 
Scenario 1  Investors (each) Non-investors (each) 
All invest   20    _ 
Two invest   13   17 
One invests    7   14 
Nobody invests   _   10 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
1)   What will you earn if all of you invest in the project? 
2)   What will you earn if nobody invests in the project? 
3)   What will you earn if you invest only by yourself? 
4)   What will you earn if you and one other member invest? 
 
Practice 2 
Suppose you are in Scenario 2. 
 
Scenario 2  Investors (each) Non-investors (each) 
All invest   13    _ 
Two invest    9   15 
One invests    5   12 
Nobody invests   _   10 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
1)   What will you earn if all of you invest in the project? 
2)   What will you earn if nobody invests in the project? 
3)   What will you earn if you invest only by yourself? 
4)   What will you earn if you and one other member invest? 
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SURVEY 
 
CODE NUMBER_________________ 
 
1.  AGE_____________    
2.  What is your sex?  (Circle one number.)      00   Female 01 Male 
3.    Married? (Circle one number.)    00  NO            01  YES  
4.    Children? (Circle one number.)       00  NO          01   YES 
 
5.  How often do you attend religious services? 
00  Never  01 Less than once a month   02 At least once a month 
03  Once a week.  04  More than once a week. 
 
6.  Are you employed?  00  No  01  Yes, Part time 02  Yes, Full time 
 
7.  Which of the following categories best describes you?  (Circle one number.) 
01  Asian-American/Oriental   02 Black/African-American  03  White/Caucasian 
04  Hispanic-Black/Spanish-speaking Black  05 Hispanic-White/Spanish-speaking White 
06  Native American/American Indian  07   Other (Please specify:_______________________________________) 
 
8.  Class  (Circle one number) 
00  Freshman          01  Sophomore          02  Junior          03   Senior          04   Graduate Student 
 
9.   Major  (Circle one number) 
00  Economics          01  Other Business          02  Psychology          03  Sciences          04  Liberal Arts          05    Other 
 
10.  How many Economics classes have you taken at the university level?  (Circle one) 
None               One               Two               Three               Four               Five               Six               More than Six 
Please respond to items 11 through 14 by circling the number on the rating scale that best represents your opinion about that item.  
Your responses will remain completely anonymous.  
  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
   Strongly 
Agree 
11. The procedures followed in this experiment preserved your anonymity. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. The money you passed to your designated charity will be sent to the 
charity. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. The instructions for the experiment were clear and easy to follow. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. The recipients of donations to your designated Charity are deserving of 
support. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
